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Abstract
The Zambian side of the Lake Kariba fishery has been 
characterised by a near 'open access' regime. Fishers have 
set-up settlements anywhere on the fishery and in most cases 
did not observe fishing regulations in force. Policies are 
now being implemented to make fishing communities become part 
of the decision-making processes on the fishery. It is 
envisaged that through co-management, fishers will appreciate 
the need to utilise the fishery sustainably thereby improving 
their livelihoods. The paper looks at the reasons that gave 
rise to co-management on the fishery and problems and 
conflicts that are now arising in its implementation.
Table 2s Graph Showing Production Trends Between 1962-1993
Notes:
a) Production Figures from 1964 to 1968 are from Bourdi^Llon,, et 
al. p. 153.
b) There is no data available for the period 1975 to 1979 as the 
lake was officially 'closed' at the height of the war' of 
liberation in Zimbabwe.
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Introduction1
Lake Kariba is one of the largest in the world. It Was 
created in the mid—1950'.s following the putting up of a barrier on 
the Zambezi River. It attained its maximum capacity in 1963. The 
project was primarily aimed at providing hydro-electric power to 
the copper mines in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and the emerging\ 
industrial sector in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The formation 
of the lake, however, led to the displacement of a large number of 
Tonga people who, for generations, had relied on the alluvial 
soils deposited on the banks of the Zambezi River for their 
subsistence agriculture. Authorities behind the project were of 
. the view that compensation for lost agricultural land wpuld come 
in the form of high incomes from commerciail fishing. -
Thirty years later the Tonga and other fishing communities on 
the lake are still engaged in semi-commercial artisanal fishing. 
This sector is still characterised by very, low investments in 
equipment, use of household labour and involvement in other 
productive activities such as agriculture. Fish markets are 
unregulated, and fragmented and there has been a general lack of 
services and infrastructure to improve livelihoods. Commercial 
fishing which commenced in 1980, on the other hand, has been 
characterised by high investments in fishing gear, and use of hired 
labour. The promised high incomes for the artisanal sector have 
clearly not been achieved. The electricity generated from Kariba 
Dam has not led to creation of industries which would absorb some 
of the local labour. Apart from a few. locals who have been 
employed by the power company, the majority have not seen any 
positive contributions of the project. The few irrigation schemes 
in the area are mostly capital intensive and have only contributed 
to further land shortages for semi-commercial agriculture.
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented and discussed at the 
Zambia/Zimbabwe SADC Fisheries Project Inshore Working Group workshop held at 
Lake Kariba Fisheries Research Institute, ll-12th December, 1995.
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Communication within the valley and with the rest of the country 
is still rudimentary. Today, the fishery and surrounding areas 
remain one of /the least developed regions in the country.
New policies are now being implemented to make the artisanal 
sector and other stake-holders on the lake become part of the 
decision-making process. It is envisaged that under the new 
regime of co-management, stake-holders will be able to participate 
in decision making on issues that directly, affect their operations 
on the lake. This will eventually lead to sustainable use of the 
lake and its resources and reverse the decline in fish harvests as 
well as the living conditions of the stake-holders. This paper 
looks at the reasons that led to the implementation of co­
management on the lake. It will try to show the role of fishing 
among the Tonga before and after the creation of the lake; the 
emergence of other ethnic groups on the fishery; and discusses 
some of the conflicts and problems that are now emerging as 
diverse user-groups expropriate or lose opportunities.
Methods
Two methods Were used in collecting data for this paper. 
Firstly, extensive review of the literature was done to trace the 
role of the Tonga and other fishing/households before and after 
creation of the lake. Secondly, some of the data comes from field 
notes obtained during the collection of information on a survey of 
the Socio-Economic Characteristics of Fishing Households on Lake 
Kariba during the months of May and August 1995. This data was 
collected through random interviews of fishers. It was augmented 
by open-ended interviews with chiefs and Department of Fisheries 
officials.
Unless stated, Lake Kariba in this paper will refer to the 
part of the lake found on the Zambian side only.
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Concepts and Definitions
The noticeable characteristics of Common-Pool Resources (CPR) 
such as a fishery pertain to access to a commons and the rights 
conferred upon those who have access to withdraw or subtract 
resources from the common-pool. Mckay1 defines a Common-Pool 
Resource as a class of resources where it is difficult to draw 
boundaries or prevent others from partaking of those resources. 
This is particularly pertinent to a CPR with fugitive resources 
such as a fishery. In such CPR's the resource will not respect any 
boundaries that are artificially drawn-up. The relevant rights, 
therefore, are those related to access and withdrawal. Although 
Common-Pool Resources is sometimes used interchangeably with 
Common Property Resources, the latter refers to a class of 
property rightsr The typical features of.this class are rights not 
to be excluded from the use of something or the right to use 
something in common with others;
-"Property rights define the uses which are legitimately 
viewed Us being exclusive and who has these exclusive 
rights. Rights also have a temporal dimension comprising 
the present and the future. The institutional 
arrangements include mechanisms for defining and 
enforcing rights, consisting of not only formal 
procedures but also social custom and the legitimacy and 
recognition of rights."2
Being cultural and social constructs, the rights to access 
and withdraw can differ from one type of CPR to another. Indeed, 
one CPR can have different rights operating at one particular 
time. Rights to a commons can also change owing to socio-economic 
transformations occurring within a population with rights. Four 
types of institutional arrangements or management regimes have 
been identified in most of the CPR's: open access or laissez-
3
faire, communal, private or market and state. Some authors3 also 
identify international governance as a fifth management regime.
Under an open-access regime there is no authority or 
institutional arrangements that confer the rights to access and 
withdraw from a CPR. For such an arrangement, it is assumed that 
users will enter and withdraw from a CPR for as long as this adds 
to their personal gain. The users are assumed to possess selfish 
tendencies; pursue personal and private goals; and the rate of 
their withdraw does hot give an opportunity to the CPR to 
naturally replenish itself. Left to their own, the users would 
eventually create a 'Tragedy of the Commons.'4 It is therefore 
suggested that to prevent a tragedy from taking place, there is 
need to either place the commons in private hands Or allow the 
state to take over.
This 'tragic' view of the commons has, however, received a 
number of criticisms. Hardin has been accused of being culture- 
bound5; of not taking cognisance of the.sense of belonging to a 
community which may over-ride individualistic tendencies6 and 
that over-exploitation cannot occur where inefficient technology 
is used. Most fisheries managers subscribe to Hardin's theory and 
their management culture focuses on preventing a tragedy from 
taking place. This is done by controlling access to a fishery 
through the use of licenses or by setting individual fish quotas. 
Withdraw on a fishery is normally contained by restricting certain 
type of gear, observing closed seasons or by allowing fishers to 
obtain a specified quantity of fish at a given time.
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Whereas a lot of criticisms have been levelled against 
Hardin, he has been acclaimed for designing a model to illustrate 
the degradation of a commons rather than trying to explain 
reality;
"The unconscious embrace of Hardin' s model is the reason 
that critiques of it have been of great value 
rather than methodologically misguided; decision maker's 
who base policy on Hardin' s model may be trying to solve 
the wrong problem."7
Under communal management, local-level institutions are given 
prominence. Exclusive rights are conferred upon a distinguishable 
group of people. Under such a regime rights can be held in common, 
privately or a combination of both. State management, on the other 
hand, recognises the significance of the state in managing a CPR 
on behalf of all its citizens or a group of its citizens. The 
state will use its agents or ministries to oversee that particular 
CPR.
Fisheries Management Based on Hardin’s Theory
.As pointed out above, most fisheries managers feel that if 
fishers are left on their own, then a 'Tragedy of the Commons!' is 
likely to occur. Regulations to limit access and withdrawal are 
therefore drawn up and implemented as a remedy to the problem. The 
issuing of licenses to permit entry -into a. fishery and the 
licensing of gear and boats is aimed at controlling access so as 
to avert an open-access regime. Howev,er, restricting access to a
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fishery will only be effective if there exists a mobile and 
effective policing mechanism. In most developing countries where 
the state has centralised the management of a fishery, it is not 
uncommon for state agents to be insufficiently funded. This leads 
to licensing becoming arbitrary as there is no adequate data upon 
which to give licenses. It also contributes to the evasion of 
regulations by users.
Withdrawal is restricted by stipulating the quantity or type
of fish to be harvested at a given time or the Total Allowance
Catch (TAC). This is done by controlling the number and type of
gear each user is allowed to own. Regulating type Of gear leads to
controlling effort as well as allowing breeding and immature fish
to escape. Withdrawal can also be controlled by prohibiting
fishing during a specific season. The drawback with relying.on TAC
as a mechanism for controlling withdrawal is the need for reliable
data to determine how the harvest is to be distributed. Although
selling points can provide information on distribution, this is
not possible where a fishery is characterised by scattered,
individual fishers who do not have a regulated market:
"Although cheap, estimates are often extremely . 
inaccurate, because adoption of TAC is often accompanied 
by a deterioration of data quality and under reporting, 
since regulatory technique puts a premium on cheating/ 
which enforcement fails to halt. Thus, expense and lack 
of locally available personnel put the TAC technique 
beyond the means of most third world countries."®
Restricting gear can also lead to conflicts and increase
socio-economic differences on a fishery. Once restrictions are
imposed, poor-resource households may not be able to invest in
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other type of gear required. Where such fishers rely on fishing as 
a sole source of income, this can lead to destitution- Resource- 
endowed households will be able to invest in new gear thereby 
increasing socio-economic differences and conflicts. Restriction 
on ty^e of mesh might not work for all species of fish and might 
be Uneconomical in the long-run by allowing other species to 
remain largely unharvested.
It is also vital to note that all forms of regulations 
governing a CPR such as a fishery need not be at variance with 
the social, cultural, economic and political institutions 
operating within that particular society. The emphasis by most 
managers to enforce fishing regulations without taking cognisance 
of the socio-cultural situation may be misplaced. Instead, such 
policies may lead to frictions between and among diverse users of 
a fishery.
"... fisheries management is a highly controversial 
matter that divides rather than unites various user 
groups and which brings user groups at odds with 
government. Opinions differ as to what should be the 
specific aims of fisheries management and how various 
concerns should be ranked."9
Co-management of fisheries has been proposed as offering a 
solution to some of the conflicts that arise in management of 
such CPR's. Co-management entails .power-sharing of rights and 
responsibilities between government agents and citizens with a 
stake in a fishery. The advantage of co-management is that 
government agents do not view users as bent on creating a 
'tragedy' but become equal partners in decision-making. Equally, 
it becomes cost-effective for governments as regulations will be 
■ ' • ■ 7 ' \
agreed upon and implemented in liaison with the stake-holders. 
According to Mckay10 co-management will be very effective when all 
or some' of these conditions have been met;
a) The process leading to.co-management should be bottom-up 
rather than.top-down;
b) Emphasis is placed on the active participation of all 
stake-holders;
c) User-groups should be allowed to play an 
influential role in decision-making; and
d) Government ministries or its agents are involved at 
various stages of regulating process but should not be the 
principal actors.
It is therefore essential that prior to implementing a co- 
management regime, local institutiohs which serve all the stake-, 
holders are identified. These local institutions then become a 
vehicle through which co-management is implemented. Ideally, 
these local institutions need.be as small as practicable. Large 
scale structures are more likely to be ineffective and commonly 
avoid responsibility.11
Most of the successful co-management regimes have been 
recorded in coastal fisheries. The inshore fishery of Japan where 
fishermen are involved in management through cooperatives and the 
cod fishery of Norway are successful examples of co-management. 
In the co-management regimes of South East Asia a number of 
problems related to high expectations of immediate results by 
users; lack of integration between researchers and users and the 
lack of appreciation of research work by users have been 
encountered.12 There are few examples of Co-management regimes in 
fisheries sector in Africa. Most of the fisheries have been under
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various forms of centralised state, control and it is only now that 
co-management is being introduced.
The Lake Kariba Fishery
Lake Kariba formed following the constructing of a barrier on 
the Zambezi River at Kariba Gorge. The 300 kilometre long lake 
straddles the Zambia/Zimbabwe border. It is about 32 kilometres at 
its widest and has a carrying capacity of approximately 190,000 
million cubic metres. The water body extends from Devil's Gorge 
just below Victoria Falls to the dam wall near Siavonga. At the 
time of its. construction the lake was hailed as a marvel of modern 
engineering which could rank with the seven wonders of the world.
The lake is situated in the Luangwa/Zambezi Valley. The 
valley slopes about 100 kilometres over a distance of 20-30 
kilometres. Unlike the steep escarpment which is sparsely 
populated the valley floor has the highest population density.
Until recently, the area bordering the lake was under one 
local administration, the Gwembe District Council. Between 1991/2 
the council was divided into three separate councils namely 
Siavonga, Gwembe and Sinazongwe. Traditional authority is 
administered through chiefs and headmen who also sit on district 
council committees. In 1989 the population in all the three 
districts was estimated to be 116,375 with a population density of 
2.9 persons per square kilometre.13 However, due to arable land
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scarcity which is estimated to be at 10-15% of total land area, 
population density in.some districts is as high as 70 persons per 
square kilometre.14
The most productive areas of the Gwembe Valley are about 100 
kilometres from the main tarred road on the Zambian Plateau. These 
areas are Connected by two tarred roads to Siavonga and Sinazeze 
respectively. A third gravel road connects Chipepo on the shores 
Of the lake to Gwembe which is on the plateau. Economically the 
region relies on agriculture, fish and the few industries located 
in the valley. These are the electric power company, a coal mine 
and a cotton ginnery. The region exports1labour, fish, livestock, 
semi-processed cotton and power. In turn it imports almost all its 
household needs and agricultural implements. The region is one of 
the least developed in the country in spite of the fact that it 
produces about fifty percent of the country's electricity;
"There has been virtually no regional development in the 
proper sense i.e* fostering of intra-regional transfer or 
exchanges and a progressive division of labour. On the 
contrary, all developments which have taken place to date 
have been export-oriented.",s
On the fishery the largest group of users belong to the 
artisanal sector. They number about 2,000 and use unseaworthy 
dug-out canoes. Fish is harvested by the use of nets which are 
normally set end to end in the. evenings and checked the. following 
morning. Although a number of fishers in this category own 
motorised vessels, they use these for transport rather than for 
fishing purposes. Very few operators in this sector use hired
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labour. Most of them use household labour. The sector has also got 
a distinct division of labour. Whereas the actual setting and 
removal of nets is done by males, fish processing and marketing is 
usually done by women. Processing through smoking or sun-drying is 
done.locally and the processed fish is later transported to urban 
markets for sale. Only fishers near to the main roads take 
advantage of their proximity to the urban markets to trade in 
fresh fish which fetches more money.
The other significant users of the lake are commercial 
fishers. Due to the high cost of purchasing equipment, they are 
not as numerous as the artisanal fishers. Commercial fishers 
primarily target the Tanganyika sardine (kapenta) which they 
harvest through the use.of mechanised rigs and hired labour. All 
their harvest is sold to the urban markets as a cheap source of 
protein. Recently, some district councils have leased a number of 
islands on the lake to tour operators. These have introduced game- 
viewing safaris and cater for sport-fishing. A number of other 
users harvest fish for subsistence. These use hooks, baskets and 
other devices. Some of the surpluses obtained in this manner by 
fishers near the main road is usually sold to fresh-fish traders.
Studies done on the Zambezi river prior to the impoundment 
indicate that there were about 40 species of fish. The most 
abundant were A. Lateralis, Cyphomyrus, Dischorhynchus, Malepterus 
electricus and White Bream (Tilapia mortimeri). After impoundment 
the number of species increased to 50 and 90% of the fish caught 
by weight comprised of Tiger fish (Hydrocynus vittatus), Eastern
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bottlenose (Mormyrus longirostris), and the Brown Squeaker
(Synodontis Zambezensis). The majority of these species are
limited to the shallow areas of the lake. The only pelagic fish in
the lake is the Tanganyika sardine or 'Kapenta* (:Limnothrisa
miodin) which was introduced in the lake from Tanganyika in the 
* _
1960's. ;
It was estimated that after impoundment annual catches 
would be around 20,000 tonnes. These; were, however, Very 
optimistic estimates as they have never been attained (see table 
2 below). Ih 1993, the most harvested species were Tiger fish, 
Red-breasted bream and Brown Squeaker in that order .16
Fishing on the Zambezi River
Until after 1900 when missionaries and settlers started 
making visits to the Gwembe Valley, the area was primarily 
populated by the Tonga people. It has not yet been determined when 
they came to the area but when David'Livingstone passed through 
the region in I860, he found them cultivating on the banks of the 
Zambezi River. The river was their main source of sustenance as 
it provided alluvial soils for agriculture in a region with low 
rainfall and high temperatures. They mostly cultivated bulrush 
millet, sorghum and maize. Produce from subsistence agriculture
12
was supplemented by gathering of wilda:£ruits5 and roots, shunting
, ' 8 . - . ~Z £C L  *and fishing. Prior to the establishment :of ccotonla I a dm inistr-at i ve 
structures, the Tonga had no centralised poTitiGal' author.ity^ They 
were never structured as a group but were heldg together by 
inheritance rights to land and property and by the cult lof the 
ancestral shades.17 Most of the chieftaincies currently found in 
the area are non-indigenous and were a creation of colonial 
authorities. Colson18 has further noted that the Tonga were so 
independent that when colonialists asked them to choose village
headmen, they usually chose former slaves as they were the ones
/-
associated with outsiders.
More than seven fishing devices ranging from stone or cane 
barriers to fish baskets, spears, nets and poisons were known and 
used by the Tonga. Fishing was also done under a wide range of 
water^conditions and rituals associated with fishing were also 
performed. For instance, it was not allowed to fish in areas 
associated with rain shrines (Malende) and ancestral spirits were 
called upon to bless new fishing devices such as baskets before 
they could be used.19 ^
The Tonga did not however, develop an advanced trade in fish 
with other ethnic groups outside the valley. Most of the fish Was 
traded locally under barter terms. Lack of trade in fish has 
principally been linked to the terrain which made it impossible 
for the Tonga to exploit markets elsewhere. Traders could easily
obtain suppliesfrom the Kafue flats or the Barotse plains than 
risk coming to the valley. Secondly, the prevalence of mosquitoes
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and high temperatures discouraged fish traders from coming into 
the valleyv to buy fish. Thirdly, the Zambezi was such a fast 
flowing river that canoes were only used for crossing and not for 
setting nets. As such not a lot of surpluses could be obtained to 
sustain markets elsewhere.
The lack of a developed external fish market among the Tonga
has been perceived as evidence of non-fishing traditions. It
was argued that the Tonga were not fishermen and as such would
not take advantage of the new opportunities to be created by the
lake. Tobias, for instance, observed that:
"...the swift flow of the Zambezi river, the fear of 
crocodiles and the near absence of fishing techniques and 
traditions have ruled-out fish as a source of
nutrition."20
The wide range of fishing devices used by the Tonga not only 
indicate the knowledge of fishing but were also adequate in
providing the Tonga enough proteins to supplement a largely 
carbohydrate diet. The devides used were also designed in such a 
way that fish stocks were sustainably harvested. Chirwa21 has 
noted that on Lake Malawi weirs and traps could only be used in 
shallow waters and during the rain season. When the rivers flooded 
the traps were removed for fear that they may be washed away. They 
were also constructed in such a way that fish-fry could easily 
pass through. Additionally, fish poison could only be used in 
still or slow moving waters and its effectiveness was limited to 
a short-period of time. The amount, depth and flow of water could 
easily reduce its strength.
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The creation of a barrier on the Zambezi River to form Lake 
Kariba was to radically alter the subsistence economy of the 
Tonga. Firstly, they were going to lose their gardens on the banks 
of the river. Secondly, they would be forced to leave their 
ancestral homes, shrines and be relocated in areas where they 
were not familiar with the environment. Thirdly, they would lose 
contact with most of their kin across the Zambezi and see the 
disintegration of cohesive neighbourhoods. The chiefs, who had 
been grouped under a central authority known as the Gwembe Tonga 
Native Authority, negotiated and Obtained compensation for the 
loss of gardens, maize crop, huts and other related structures. On 
the other hand, the federal authority was of the opinion that the 
Tonga would take advantage of new fishing opportunities to turn 
into commercial fishers. To this effect, a fisheries training 
school to teach the Tonga new' fishing methods, boat building and 
net mending was opened at Sinazongwe on the Shores of Lake Kariba. 
In addition, chiefs and some of their subjects were taken on study 
trips to the northern fisheries to see and learn fishing methods 
of other ethnic groups. It was also decreed that the Tonga would 
have exclusive fishing rights on the lake for the first ten-years 
after commencement of commercial fishing. Colsof^2 has noted that 
the ten-year exclusive rights were conferred upon the Tonga 
because:
i) the lake-shore would cover their former homes and 
gardens hence they had the 'first in time, first in 
right' claims to the resource; and
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ii) due to a shortage of fertile agricultural lands in the 
resettlement areas, most of the Tonga would have to 
rely on fishing for their livelihood.
It is estimated that in 1959 there were 407 Tonga fishers
owning 748 gill-nets and 93 boats. In 1962 the number of fishermen
had risen to 2 500 harvesting about 3 000 tonnes of fish. By 1964,
however, a lot of Tonga people had stopped fishing and begun
experimenting with semi-commercial agriculture.
"By 1964 fishing was no longer a major interest for the 
majority of the Gwembe men. They turned back to labour 
migration or local wage work, or begun to experiment 
hopefully with cotton farming or other forms of cash 
cropping."23
As the bio-system of the Take became more stable, catches 
initially rose and this attracted more fishers to take up the 
trade. The increased number of fishers led to a depletion of 
stocks in nearby waters and fishers were then forced to migrate to 
islands or go further into the lake. The increased costs of 
catching the fish and bringing it to the shore for sale began to 
increase costs and make fishing an uneconomic investment. 
Secondly, the majority of the Tonga who became wealthy from 
fishing were viewed by their kin as using magic which required the 
sacrifice of their relatives. They were viewed as having 
"...invested in medicine which required the sacrifice of kinsmen 
through magical means.1,24 As a way of avoiding such social 
pressures the majority Of the Tonga quit fishing and re-invested 
their capital in agricultural implements and livestock.
Thirdly, the Tonga mode of production relied on reciprocity rather 
than payment for services rendered. Those who employed their
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relatives expected them not to get paid as they were presumed to 
be working for their relatives. This compelled most young men to 
became labour migrants.
The exit* of the majority of the Tonga from the fishery saw an 
influx of other ethnic groups. This in-migration became more 
pronounced during the mid-1970's. Factors attributed to this 
movement of fishers are that there was a decline in catches in 
northern Zambia fisheries. Encouraged by the post-colonial state 
policies which espoused national unity through 'One Zambia, One 
Nation,1 the majority of these fishers moved to Lake Kariba. 
Secondly, the role of chiefs in the post-colonial era decreased 
at the expense of ruling party functionaries. The Tonga Chiefs 
Native Authority lost credibility among most of the Tonga. Its 
officials were blamed for not preventing the creation of the lake 
by siding with the federal authority.25 The lack of a collective 
response to the immigrants encouraged more people from other 
regions to come to the area. The role of witchcraft within Tonga 
society played a part as. well; according to Colson26 the Tonga 
do not view outsiders as being capable of harming them in any way. 
The only threat is from their kin who might want to kill them 
through sorcery so as to inherit their wealth. Outsiders are 
considered to be incapable of having such ideas. The fishers who 
came into the fishery were, therefore, not viewed with hostility 
or suspicion by the Tonga. Incidences of violence towards these 
newcomers were few and isolated.
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It should be noted that subsequent to the lifting of the 
communal management regime that had existed for the initial ten- 
year period, a centralised management regime through the 
Department of Fisheries took over. This was effective for as long 
as government funding to the department was adequate. As the 
country started experiencing an economic downturn from the mid- 
1970's, funding was gradually reduced and a 'de facto' open access 
regime began to emerge on the fishery. The reduction in funding 
to DoF led to the production of unreliable and inconsistent data 
on the fishery as there was insufficient personnel to record 
catches from scattered fishers. Shortage of personnel also led to 
an increase in the use of prohibited gear as monitoring and 
policing almost became non-existent. (See Table 1 below).
The down-grading of the role of chiefs and other traditional 
authority contributed to the setting up of fishing camps and 
villages anywhere on the shore-line (see Map below). These 
settlements were either temporal or permanent as fishers could set 
up camps wherever they felt they could maximise their harvest. 
These movements and settlements were done without permission from 
any authority, local or otherwise. As such, it was not possible 
to determine the exact number of fishermen operating on the lake 
at one particular time. Other criminal elements took advantage of 
this to engage in cross-border smuggling and poaching. Related to 
the above, is the lack of resources at the disposal of district 
councils. As state funding dwindled, councils were unable to make 
any meaningful investments into the fishery. Provision of social
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services began to. be neglected and councils were also unable to 
employ staff to collect levies from fishers arid fish traders. In 
addition to these problems was the war of liberation in 
neighbouring Zimbabwe which forced DoF to officially 'close' the 
lake and also led to the destruction of infrastructure and 
disruption of settlements.
Table 1: Factors contributing to a near open-access regime
Reduced funding to DoF-
■Unreliable/inconsistent data. 
-Lack of extension to fishers.
-Inability to enforce regulations. 
-Shortage of staff/resources.
--Inability to control entry
— Increase in mobility of fishers
Reduced role of chiefs-----
in management -- Involvement of 'fishers'
in poaching/smuggling
Reduced funding to councils
■Poor Infrastructure on fishery
■Inadequate social services to 
fishers
Inability to monitor/levy fish 
traders
Adapted from: Chipungu, et al, "Management of the Lake Kariba Inshore Fisheries 
(Zambia): A Proposal," Project Report 32, (Zambia/Zimbabwe SADC Fisheries 
Project, Chilanga).
Among others, the problems mentioned above gave rise t o . a 
need to change the management of the lake as a way of reversing 
the declining living conditions of households dependent on the
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fishery. It was also at" a time of social political changes in the 
country such that traditional authority felt that they had to 
reassert their control over the fishery and those who used it. To 
achieve these objectives, the Department of Fisheries organised a 
workshop and invited most of the stake-holders. The workshop 
attracted about 60 participants. Of this number, eight represented 
the artisanal sector, ten were drawn from the traditional rulers 
and the rest represented government ministries, the council and 
Non-Governmental Organisations.
The problems in table 1 above were cited as the major 
hindrances to improved livelihoods by the various stakeholders at 
the workshop. It is worthy noting that of all the problems 
mentioned the status of the fish-stocks was not mentioned as a 
very urgent problem. It was only mentioned that the use of 
destructive gear would disrupt fishing. There was no reference to 
its present status and how it is to re-allocated to the stake­
holders. What it means therefore was that the introduction of co- 
management on the lake was driven more by a desire to reverse the 
breakdown in decision-making arrangements than the need to 
distribute the resource equitably to all stake-holders. It might 
be added that the grossing over of discussions on the stock has to 
do with the fact that reduction in catches is associated more with 
the biological nature of the lake and rainfall patterns in the 
catchment areas than use of illegal gear, (see table 2 in annex 
1) •
20
Co-management was suggested as being the effectivie management 
regime for the fishery. Local authorities, especially chiefs and 
their headmen were selected as the institutions through which co­
management was to be achieved. Chiefs were asked to identify areas 
under their jurisdiction where permanent fishing villages were to 
be constructed. They were, assisted by officials of the DoF who 
wanted to ascertain that the new settlements would not affect fish 
breeding areas. Commercial fishers also promised cash and 
material help in relocating the artisanal sector. It is important 
to note that commercial fishers gave the offer because they felt 
that the artisanal sector was responsible for most of their losses 
and if settled in permanent villages then it would be easy to 
control their movements.
The Process
The workshop resolved that for easy management, the lake- 
shore would have to be divided into four zones. Each zone 
falling under the jurisdiction of Chiefs' Mweemba, Sinazongwe, 
Chipepo and Simamba respectively. The zones were further sub­
divided into fishing villages. The zones are to be managed by the 
chief, representatives from the village committees,,commercial 
fishermen. Non-governmental Organisations and people owning 
businesses within each particular zone. This is known as the Zonal
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Fisheries Management Committees (ZFMC's). The ZFMC's are to be 
responsible for monitoring fishing practices and regulations as 
well as mobilising funds for development. They would also be 
responsible for arbitrating in issues brought up Fishing Village 
Management Committees (FVMC's) in their respective zones. The 
FVMC's which would comprise of a chiefs representative, in most 
cases a headman, and other elected members would be responsible 
for monitoring the day to day activities of the fishing village 
ranging from recommending new fishermen to be issued with 
licenses, assisting in enforcing fishing practices to sanitation. 
It was felt that involving fishers in day to day decision-making 
processes would make them appreciate the need to engage in good 
fishing practises thereby improving catches and subsequently their 
livelihoods.
All fishermen were told to move into new fishing villages 
and conduct their operations from there. Dual residency of fishing 
villages was abolished. In some instances, the new fishing 
villages were sited far from the old ones and fishing households 
were compelled to build new homes in the designated villages.
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Discussion
With the introduction of co-management and the creation of 
new settlements on the lake a number of problems and conflicts 
between different users are emerging. Some of the problems arise 
out of ignorance of what the programme entails and others relate 
to differing views between different stake-holders.
Tonga vs Mon-Tonga fishers
In some of the fishing villages in zones 3 and 4, most of 
those who have moved into the new camps at the time of the data- 
collection were non-Tonga fishers. Some of the Tonga interviewed 
claimed that they were not full-time fishers and as such saw no 
justification in moving from their permanent homes to go and live 
in fishing camps. However, the fishing village residents feel that 
the Tonga are fishermen as evidenced by their possession of 
fishing craft and gear. They contend that the Tonga do not want to 
move into the villages because they do not want to be bound by the 
new fishing regulations which will apply in the fishing villages 
and this is resented by some of the 'outsiders. ,27
It should be noted that the Tonga engage in more than one 
source of income as a guarantee against drought and famine which 
are prevalent in the area. Most of the non-Tonga fishermen have a 
hedge against such vagaries of nature as they invest most of their 
earnings in ventures located in urban or their home areas.28 The 
Tonga should maintain their permanent homes where they can
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continue to engage in agriculture and livestock- keeping. At the 
same time they should be allowed to set up structures in the new 
fishing villages from where they can be conducting their part-time 
fishing activities and*observing the regulations related to the 
practice. Trying to create 'perfect full-time fishers' is 
impracticable without recourse to coercive mechanisms.
Island Owners vs Artisanal Fishers
As pointed out above, councils, in their bid to raise 
revenue, are now leasing islands on the lake as one way of 
earning additional funds. However, these islands were, before the 
introduction of co-management, temporal or permanent homes to 
most of the artisanal sector from which they conducted their 
operations. In some instances, ranchers have introduced game and 
opened up tourist ventures. However, there does not seem to be a 
well thought-out policy on the boundaries of these ranches and 
areas where artisanal fishers can conduct their activities. 
Incidences of artisanal fishers being shot at by the new 'owners' 
of these islands have been reported.29 Artisanal sector feel 
betrayed that soon after moving from islands restrictions have 
been imposed on fishing. Some of the commercial fishers who also 
lease these islands contend that fishers steal their property and 
connive with traders and their (commercial operators) workers to 
steal Kapenta from the rigs.
There.is consequently need to ban traders from buying their 
kapenta from islands as one way of reducing tension. The new
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markets being created in the fishing camps should be used by 
traders to conduct their business. Additionally, the Fishing 
Village Management Committees should be able to monitor traders 
who come to their camp to buy fish or kapenta. Artisanal fishermen 
found with kapenta should be in possession of a licence to reduce 
suspicions that they steal it from operators.
As not all islands have been leased and given the claims of 
good catches by fishers, it should be possible to design a 
mechanism that would allow fishers to operate from these islands. 
This can be done by mandating the FVMC to keep a mutually agreed 
upon rotating roster which would allow fishers to operate from 
islands. This would eventually lead to accountability and reduce 
tensions between the two sectors.
The use of water surrounding islands should also be clearly 
defined. While artisanal fishermen are not allowed to operate 
about 50 meters from the leased islands,30 tour operators are free 
to take their clients anywhere on the lake. This tends to go give 
an impression among the artisanal sector that the whole exercise
i
is weighed heavily against them. This view is made more plausible 
by the fact that commercial fishers have assisted DoF in the form 
of fuel and other resources to resettle the artisanal fishers.
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Artisanal vs Commercial
While commercial fishers maintain that they lose a lot of 
their property to artisanal sectorf the converse is also true. 
Fishers lose their nets to rigs that drag them away. These nets 
are either torn apart, completely removed and in certain 
incidences sold by crews Of kapenta rigs. Loss of nets is usually 
not compensated. A mechanism should be put in place to allow for 
speedy compensation where this is proved. Commercial fishers have 
also been accused of fishing in areas where the artisanal sector 
have been prohibited. Clearly defined areas of operation for each 
sector should be drawn up.
Department of Fisheries vs Artisanal Sector
One of the reasons for introducing co-management is to curb 
the rampant use of illegal methods of fishing. Artisanal fishers 
are not allowed to fish near the river estuaries and have also got 
to set their nets about 100 metres from the shore-line.31 Gill- 
nets of mesh size less than 76mm and monofilament nets of a mesh 
size of less than 120mm are banned.32 These regulations do hot, 
however, address some of the problems faced by fishers and instead 
encourage non-compliance;
Firstly, during data collection most of the fishers said 
that fish go down rivers to breed in the rain season only. Using 
this knowledge they question the wisdom of banning them from 
fishing from estuaries all year round. The DoF should carry-out
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research to exactly, determine when fish breeds so that the rest 
of the period fishers can be allowed to fish.
Secondly, more than seventy percent of the craft on the lake 
are dug-out canoes. Those mounted with engines are largely used 
for transport. Given that lake kariba is characterised by 
uncertain weather conditions, with storms starting suddenly and 
wind direction changing abruptly, it is risky to do one's fishing 
further from the shore in a dug-out canoe. A number of fishers 
have lost their lives on the lake through the use of such crafts. 
It is therefore prudent to relax this regulation until investments 
have been made into sea-worthy crafts.
Thirdly, the issue of mesh size needs to be addressed as 
well. Although it is recognised that the piece of legislation is 
aimed at protecting breeding and juvenile fish it, nevertheless, 
allows mature breeds of certain species to go unharvested. Small 
fish species such as Brown squeaker (Synodontis zambezensis) 
attract a good price on the market1 but under current legislation, 
they can go unharvested. The research department needs to come up 
with a mechanism that will allow for these species to be caught. 
Failure to do so can only lead to non-compliance of current 
regulations and increase conflicts.
Use of Fuel Wood
With the establishment of permanent villages, pressure on 
fuel-wood for domestic use, fish processing and agricultural land 
is bound to increase. The pressure will be increased by in­
27
migration and births. Although a re-afforestation programme was 
initiated under a GTZ project, the re-grouping exercise has meant 
that fishers moved to new villages and lett their plantations in 
the old villages. Given the fragile nature of the soils in the 
valley, priority should also be given to an afforestation 
programme.
Broken Promises
In implementing a co-management regime it is essential to 
provide incentives that will convince stake-holders that in the 
long-run they stand to benefit from the new arrangement. As co­
management initially involved the restructuring of settlement 
patterns, the incentives offered to the artisanal sector were 
related more to provision of social services than increased 
catches or improved fish prices. As social services are provided 
by other government agencies and not DoF,, there has arisen a 
credibility gap between the artisanal sector and DoF. There is a 
feeling of disillusionment among the fishers as most of these 
social services have not been provided except in areas with 
effective Non-Governmental Organisations. Given the financial 
standing of the government and councils in particular, it would be 
far-fetched to suggest that schools and health care facilities 
would be provided in the near future. This frustration for broken 
promises is usually directed at the DoF as it is seen as the 
'engine' behind the resettlement programme. It is recommended that 
institutions make clear their capability to provide the proflfised
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services,other wise the whole programme will be seen in negative 
light by the fishing communities.
Coordination
A number of institutions both government and quasi-government 
are currently engaged in a number of activities on the lake. 
These range from district councils, the police, Department of 
Wildlife, Ministry of Tourism, the DoF and Non-Governmental 
Organisations. With such a wide range of institutions there is 
need to create a Consultative Group through which different 
agendas can be harmonised. Such a group can meet to inform others 
of their activities and avoid duplication as well as confusion, 
among the target group. Instances where the district councils 
invite police to evict fishers from islands and then the DoF is 
blamed for the affair can be avoided.
Zonal Committees vs Fishing Village Management Committees
The new co-management arrangement provides for the zonal 
committee to monitor the implementation of fishing regulations as 
well as mobilise funds for development. The FVMC^Sre largely 
responsible for monitoring the day to day activities of the camps. 
However, membership of the zonal committees comprises of 
individuals who, in most cases, are not artisanal fishers but can 
pass policy that influences the activities of fishers. The FVMC's 
need to be strengthened and given powers to veto decisions passed
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by the zonal committees. During data collection it was observed 
that most committee members at the FVMC level took arbitrary 
decisions, rarely held meetings and'financial statements were not 
up to date indicating lack of management skills. Most members at 
this level perceive their role to be similar to that enjoyed by 
political officials during the one-party era. As it is at this 
^level where the success or failure of co-management will be 
determined, more resources.should be directed here. Members and 
non- members alike should be given managerial skills as well as 
teaching them their roles and responsibilities on co-management. 
The majority of Zonal Committee membership is composed of those 
with interests which are at variance with the artisanal sector.
Concluding Remarks
The paper has made an attempt to show the rationale behind 
the new concept of co-management on the northern shores of Lake 
Kariba. It showed that attempts by federal authorities to turn the 
Tonga into commercial fishers were largely unsuccessful. This was 
due to the fact that their mode of production was geared towards 
subsistence living rather than producing for profits. The 
departure of the Tonga, and the decline of traditional authority 
in the post colonial era led to a 'de facto' open-access regime 
emerging on the lake. This was made worse by reduced government
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funding to its agents on the lake. However, there is a possibility 
that the Tonga will yet again take up fishing in a much more 
serious manner. This is because the soils are increasingly getting 
degraded and will not support increased cultivation. The decline 
in traditional beliefs as a result of churches and education might 
give an added impetus for them to take up fishing. This might add 
another dimension to the Tonga and 'outsiders' perception of who 
owns the resources on the lake.
The concept of co-management was initiated as a mechanism to 
involve users in the management of the lake. However, a number of 
issues still need to be addressed; Is the creation of permanent 
settlements going to reverse the decline in catches given the fact 
that fishermen originally left their permanent villages in search 
of better fishing grounds? Do non-Tonga fishers identify 
themselves with the new structures under the leadership of Tonga 
traditional authority? Does the current socio-political situation 
in the country favour decentralisation of authority to local and 
traditional institutions? Answers to these and other questions 
will be the focus of a forthcoming paper.
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